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MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS:
A PREVENTIVE VIEW
TAMAR FRANKEL*
Introduction
The recent rising failure of municipalities has not produced
the avalanche that some expected.1 Yet concerns have been raised
that the future will spawn more failures.2 New York City and other
municipalities face soaring pension, Medicaid, and retiree health care
costs.3 New York City’s neighboring counties face similar
challenges; Yonkers, Suffolk, and Nassau Counties each face their
own set of fiscal problems.4
Municipalities that have failed, or are likely to fail, have
raised a number of legal issues implicated by their inability to pay
their debts. Some questions seem new. For example, are employees’
pension benefits “debts” or are they “social obligations”?5 The status
of pensions is unclear and is being litigated.6 Additionally, the results
of default are serious and can result in loss of access to the capital
markets.7 Adding even more uncertainty to this situation, state
*

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
60 Minutes: States Budgets: Day of Reckoning (CBS television broadcast
Dec. 19, 2010), available at http://cbsnews.com/videos/state-budgets-dayof-reckoning (Meredith Whitney warning of impending municipal financial
meltdown).
2
Jeremy Hazlehurst, Distressed Investing: Still No Flood, PRIVATE EQUITY
INT’L
(Nov.
4,
2013),
http://peimedia.com/Article.aspx?aID=
5817&article=74745 (“The expected deluge of distressed deals may not
have happened yet—but there are plenty of reasons for investors in the
space to be optimistic . . . .”).
3
Paul Burton, N.Y.’s Ravitch and Brodsky Weigh the Status of Pension
Obligations, BOND BUYER (Apr. 20, 2012, 7:12 PM), http://bondbuyer.
com/issues/121_77/ravitch-brodsky-status-pension-obligations-1038831-1.
html (“Cities . . . continue to struggle with unfunded pension liabilities . . . .”).
4
See id. (detailing the credit rating downgrades of several New York
counties).
5
Id.
6
See id.
7
Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign
Default Risk and Private Sector Access to Capital in Emerging Markets 8
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/10, 2010) (analyzing the
1
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provisions about municipal bankruptcy filings vary.8 They range
from closing the door to bankruptcy proceedings to opening the door
wide to them.9
In 2011, “Rhode Island passed a law giving bondholders first
lien on revenue,” which allowed a municipality to file for Chapter 9
protection.10 Following the law’s passage, “the city’s receiver . . .
invalidated pension agreements and finalized new settlements that
cut benefits by 55%.”11 In Pennsylvania, “a federal court invalidated
a Chapter 9 filing by the City Council in [the] capital city
Harrisburg.”12 Despite several attempts, courts have rejected the
Harrisburg City Council’s efforts to move forward with bankruptcy
over the opposition by several municipal constituents, including the
Harrisburg mayor.13
Control boards are similar to bankruptcy boards. However,
some argue that control boards greatly overcharge for their services,
while “[b]ankruptcy brings the banks back into play.”14 These
commentators further contend that “[t]here’s a hidden meaning
behind which mayors favor bankruptcy and which mayors favor a
control board.”15
I would like to share from the municipality debacle a few
lessons for future behavior. The task is daunting because so many
conflicting interests are involved. Nonetheless, it may be worth
thinking about how, and creating processes by which, the conflict
might be resolved.
“spillover” effects of sovereign default, as well as prevalent “capital market
exclusion after sovereign defaults”).
8
Municipal Bankruptcy & the Role of the States, ISSUE BRIEF (Nat’l Ass’n
of State Budget Officers, D.C.), Aug. 21, 2012, at 3, available at
http://nasbo.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Municipal%20Bankruptcy%20%26%
20the%20Role%20of%20the%20States.pdf.
9
See id.
10
Burton, supra note 3.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
In re City of Harrisburg, Pa., 465 B.R. 744, 749 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011)
(dismissing the City Council’s filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy); see also In
re City of Harrisburg, Pa., 462 B.R. 510, 514 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011)
(denying extension of time for appeal); City of Harrisburg, Pa. v. AFSCME
Dist. Council 90, No. 1:11–BK–06938MDF, 2012 WL 315403, at *2
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2012) (dismissing the City Council’s appeal).
14
Burton, supra note 3.
15
Id.
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Are municipalities unique? To some extent they are. Most
are independent of the states and their governors.16 They are subject
to their own governing bodies and electorate.17 They are, in fact,
independent governments at a lower level. But they have a charterreliant life and, thus, a perpetual existence. Some have a longer
history than the states in which they reside.18 Additionally,
municipalities serve a community that is more closely connected. In
the past, when their members were less mobile, municipalities were
more stable. But today, their citizens may be more mobile and
unified, especially if they are connected to large movable businesses
that by definition are temporary citizens within the municipalities.
The first step in our inquiry is to identify most, if not all, of
the parties whose interests are intertwined with municipalities. That
is, the parties that contribute to, as well as claim from, the
municipalities. The second step is to assign to each party the
importance of its stake in the municipality. The interest of each party
involves: (1) the importance of the party’s stake to its well-being; (2)
the amount of money due from the municipality; and (3) the date by
which the amount is due. In addition, an issue of fairness may arise,
relating to the circumstances in which the amounts have become due
and the relative fairness-weight to be given to each claim, as
compared to the claims of other parties. The fairness of the various
parties’ claims does not necessarily lead to preventing and resolving
the repeated problems in the future. Rather, it leads to weighing the
entitlement of each of the parties. Because circumstances change,
fairness at the time when the claims were formed may not remain
fair when the claims mature. In any event, this is not the focus of this
paper; the focus of this paper is prevention.
In discussing the issue of preventing the problems that
municipalities are facing, one might ignore the current legal
constraints and suggest changes in the laws. However, there is no
escape from considering the American culture, especially with
16

For a list of all independent cities in the state of Virginia alone, see VA.
COMM’N ON LOCAL GOV’T, VIRGINIA’S INDEPENDENT CITIES WITH
CONTIGUOUS COUNTIES 1 (Va. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev. 2001).
17
See, e.g., David K. Roberts, Separate, But Equal? Virginia’s
“Independent” Cities and the Purported Virtues of Voluntary Interlocal
Agreements, 95 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1553–54 (2009).
18
The independent city of Baltimore, Maryland, for example, was founded
in 1729, some forty-seven years prior to the signing of the Declaration of
Independence in 1776. See generally GEORGE WALKER, THE ENTERIES OF
BALTEMORE TOWN (1729).
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respect to government entities. Therefore, a proposal for the future
will assume that the laws might be amended to accommodate the
proposed plan, but will emphasize the constraints of American
culture with respect to government entities. This culture will affect
the government entities that are involved in this case.
Part I of this Article identifies the parties involved. Part II
outlines the powers, duties, costs, and benefits of each involved
party. Part III describes significant conflicts that have reached the
courts and the legislatures and their solutions. The solutions are
partial because the issues can be determined differently in each state.
Part IV suggests a general preventive policy rule aimed at avoiding
future failures of municipalities. Part V concludes.
I.

The Parties Involved

A Houlihan Lokey study examined various parties for the
purpose of restructuring the financial situation of municipalities.19
The study offered “a guide for successfully navigating through the
inherently confrontational process.”20 It identified the following
involved parties: (1) civic officials; (2) employees, including their
unions and retirees; (3) citizens of the municipality; (4) creditors of
the municipality; and (5) advisers tasked with shepherding the local
government.21 My analysis tracks the same parties. When examining
the parties, I focus on three important features: the money the parties
receive; the money or services the parties “pay” in return; and the
power the parties can exercise with respect to the these items.22

19

See generally HOULIHAN LOKEY, INC., RESTRUCTURING THE TROUBLED
MUNICIPALITY
(2011),
available
at
http://hl.com/email/pdf/muni_case_study_ch_jun2011.pdf.
20
Press Release, Houlihan Lokey, Inc., Houlihan Lokey and Alvarez &
Marsal to Present Case Study ‘Restructuring the Troubled Municipality’ in
Los Angeles, New York and Chicago (May 26, 2011), available at
http://hl.com/us/press/pressreleases/2846.aspx.
21
See id.
22
See generally Christine Albano, Turnaround Firms to the Rescue, BOND
BUYER, June 22, 2011, at 1.
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The Power and Duties; Costs and Benefits of the Involved
Parties
A.

Civic Officials

Civic officials offer services to the municipality. They draw
salaries from the municipality, which could be significant. In
addition, these officials may have a significant degree of power over
the affairs of the municipality. Some officials may be corrupt.
Regardless of their trustworthiness and reliability, civic officials hold
significant power, if not the only power, over the financial affairs of
the municipality. It should be emphasized that even though the
officials are elected, some have been in office for many years, being
reelected time and again.23 Additionally, they can establish on-going
relationships with powerful citizens and regain their position. For
example, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Mayor Linda Thompson sought a
court order that would have indirectly retained her power.24 She
defended herself, stating, “I am fighting for my career.”25 She did not
see the difference between her power position and her job.26 Yet,
civic officials are fiduciaries. They owe these duties to the
municipalities and are far more restricted in their conflicts of
interests and far more liable to serve professionally and avoid
negligence.
B.

Municipality Employees and Their Unions

Municipality employees are similar to civic officials in many
respects. Employees too offer services to the municipality and draw
salaries, including pensions. They too exercise power, except that
their power is mostly manifested through unions.27 Their rights are
23

See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Rising Price of Electricity Sets off New
Debate on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at C1 (identifying Mayor
Robert Butler of Marion, Illinois as a mayor who has served for the last
fifty-one years).
24
Paul Burton, Harrisburg Mayor’s Career on the Line, BOND BUYER
(May 20, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://bondbuyer.com/issues/122_97/reelectionof-harrisburg-pennsylvania-mayor-linda-thompson-on-the-line-10518121.html.
25
Id.
26
See id.
27
See Steven Greenhouse, The Wisconsin Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2014, at BU1.
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contract-based, and their unions bargain freely for their own interests
and the interests of their union leaders.28 Thus, the employees and
their unions do not owe the municipalities duties except the duties to
perform their services. Nonetheless, some employees may also owe
the municipality fiduciary duties that vary in intensity, depending on
the amount of power and assets entrusted to them (e.g., the
municipality treasurer).
C.

Creditors of the Municipality

Municipalities that issue debt obligations create a group of
creditors and turn themselves into debtors of these creditors. These
municipalities receive payment from the creditors and owe them a
return. By law, the tax that the creditors pay on the returns is lower
than the tax on other incomes from debt securities.29 This reduced tax
is designed to draw more investors to municipal bonds and to enable
municipalities to offer lower interest rates on their obligations.30
Consequently, the municipality can raise funds at a lower rate and
the amount of its obligations is lower. The relationship between the
parties is contract based: that of a debtor and creditor. The process
may also be subject to securities acts and in some cases to
bankruptcy laws.31 Tax authorities are also interested in the subject.32

28

See id.
See Kelly Phillips Erb, Ending Tax Breaks on Municipal Bonds Shifts
Burden to the Rest of Us, FORBES (July 16, 2013, 10:27 AM),
http://forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2013/07/16/ending-tax-breaks-onmunicipal-bonds-shifts-burden-to-the-rest-of-us (explaining that, to private
creditors, the allure of municipal bonds as opposed to other forms of
municipal financing is their tax exempt status).
30
See id. (“Traditionally, municipal bonds have attracted investors because
the interest income is tax exempt for federal income tax purposes.”).
31
E.g., In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 800 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2010) (holding that the non-profit organization in question was not an
instrumentality of the state, and therefore, ineligible for Chapter 9 relief);
see also In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 695–96 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1991) (finding that, under the circumstances, the city could declare
bankruptcy under federal bankruptcy law).
32
Patrick Temple-West, Treasury Seeks More Authority: Bill Would Let
Feds Stop Firms’ Failures, 367 BOND BUYER, Mar. 26, 2009, at 1
(describing recent federal legislative interest in debtor-creditor relations).
29
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Citizens of the Municipality

Municipality citizens pay taxes to the municipality and
receive services that are performed either by the municipality’s
employees or by independent contractors. The duty to pay taxes is
subject to specific laws and procedures including fines.33 The
citizens of the municipality have power to vote for and against the
municipality officials. However, in some municipalities the citizens’
power may be weak, as it is when they are too poor, too uneducated,
or too old.
E.

Businesses Residing in the Municipality

The impact of entities that do business in a particular
municipality should not be underestimated. They attract employees,
create jobs, negotiate and affect the taxes and the development of
public facilities in the municipality, and enter into binding
agreements with municipalities.34
F.

Advisers Tasked with Shepherding the Local
Government

There are a number of persons who advise municipalities’
civic officials.35 The advisers may offer “a guide for successfully
navigating through the inherently confrontational process.”36 They
are the experts and have power especially when the civic officials are
not experts in particular areas. Among these areas of expertise are
finance and accounting.37
When do municipalities face problems? Like any other
entity, municipalities have financial problems when their spending is

33

See First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta v. P. E. Blum, 233 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1977) (holding that citizen faced immediate penalties resulting
from his delinquent tax payments to the City of Atlanta).
34
See, e.g., Rod Boshart, Iowa Business Interests Lobby for Tax Changes,
SIOUX CITY J. (Dec. 11, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/
local/state-and-regional/iowa-business-interests-lobby-for-taxchanges/article_44d659a7-c9a4-5cf4-accc-a67edbdea50a.html.
35
See, e.g., HOULIHAN LOKEY, INC., supra note 19, at 78.
36
Press Release, Houlihan Lokey, Inc., supra note 20.
37
See id.
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higher than their income.38 That is, when municipalities’ tax
revenues and other sources of income do not match the cost of the
municipal services they are providing and the debts they are
incurring. This is especially so when the cost of municipal projects is
high and long-term, while the use of these projects, which
increasingly depends on a mobile and fickle citizenship, are shortterm. Therefore, conservative estimates are necessary.
Who decides the allocation of the financing and services?
Currently, the usual decision-makers are civic officials, employeemanagers, and elected officials. The power balance varies and
politics determine some of the choices.
III.

Significant Conflicts Among the Various Actors; Courts’
and Legislatures’ Solutions

The chart below lists the parties involved. It highlights, using
the + sign, whether they receive money from the municipality and
what they offer in consideration for the money; some offer services,
others offer money. In addition, the signs used indicate the degree of
powers that each of the groups exercises. Thus, the focus is on three
important features: the money the parties receive; the money or
services the parties “pay” in return; and the power the parties can
exercise with respect to these items.
Party
Civic
Officials
Employees
and Unions
Citizens
Creditors
Advisers
Businesses

38

Receive:
Dollars
+

Offer:
Services
+

Pay:
Dollars
0

Power39

+

+

0

+

+
+
+
0

0
0
+
0

+
+
0
+

-+
-+
++

+

See, e.g., Michael Connor, More U.S. Cities Set to Enter Default Danger
Zone, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://reuters.com/article/
2012/04/17/usa-defaults-outlook-idUSL1E8EN2V520120417.
39
Powers are designated by - (very weak), -+(medium), + (strong), and ++
(very strong).
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Of course, this chart is not as precise as it seems. It is
designed to illustrate the analysis. The servicers all offer services and
receive payment. The payers are the citizens and the creditors.
However, the citizens’ power is far less legally weighty and binding
than that of the lenders. The true power of the citizens is to move out
of the municipality.40 If the citizens are also employees of the
businesses in the municipality, then the businesses have an
enormous, and perhaps the greatest, impact on the well-being of the
municipalities.
Considering the parties’ power, one might note that civic
officials have contracts and are subject to regulation and citizen
voting as well as political relationships.41 Employees and unions
have contracts and bargaining powers. Creditors have contracts and
laws, such as bankruptcy laws. Advisers have contracts. Businesses
have a relative freedom to negotiate or move. We can say they have
the market power. The citizens have the power to move, although it
might be far weaker than that of the businesses, and each citizen is
relatively less powerful unless he or she occupies some other power
position in the municipality and its politics.
A view of the laws related to municipalities demonstrates
both absence of uniformity and a strong desire on the part of many
parties to preserve the powers of the local communities. Therefore,
we must take for granted that changing to centralized, uniform
governance of municipalities on a national federal level is most
unlikely.
When and how do financial problems in municipalities
arise? For context, we look to the city of Detroit. Detroit—the
world’s “traditional” automotive center—is “the largest US city ever
to move for bankruptcy, with a liability running into $18 billion.”42
The city has dramatically deteriorated. In 2010, “the city had a
population of 713,777, more than a 60% drop down from a peak
population of over 1.8 million at the 1950 census.”43 This suggests a
40

See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (illustrating the idea that residents can vote with
their feet).
41
See generally Tamar Frankel, The Governor’s Private Eyes, 49 B.U. L.
REV. 627 (1969).
42
When Detroit, the World's Traditional Auto Capital, Files for
Bankruptcy, MONEYLIFE (July 19, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://moneylife.in/
article/when-detroit-the-worlds-traditional-auto-capital-files-forbankruptcy/33708.html.
43
Id.
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serious and “long-running decline of Detroit’s economic strength.”44
Unfortunately, “[t]he fiscal realities confronting Detroit have been
ignored for too long” and “Detroit does not have the revenues to
meet those obligations and provide an adequate level of services to
its people, who pay the highest taxes per capita in Michigan.”45
Detroit’s citizens include “[m]ore than half of the owners of
Detroit’s 305,000 properties [who] failed to pay their 2011 tax bills,
exacerbating the city’s financial crisis.”46
Even though there may be numerous reasons for the
problems, one important problem is the exit of business from the
municipality accompanied by the exit of citizens and other services.
This change, together with continuing services and other practices,
can bring a municipality like Detroit to bankruptcy. There may be
other changes that create potential problems. One feature that all
distressed municipalities experience is a gradual evolution of the
same or similar problems. When a municipality experiences a
disastrous one-time event, it is likely that federal and state authorities
will come to help, but small changes in the wrong direction do not
bring outside help.
Small negative changes are like a virus. A vaccine might
lead to immunity. No reaction might lead to death. Small changes
can be arrested by small reductions of costs and attention to where
the next might come as well as examinations of new revenues and
approaches. Continuing on the same path as if nothing has changed
or will change is the road to self-destruction. To be sure, it is difficult
to change an organization. But just as corporations have a high-level
officer to help recognize and take precautions against adverse
change, so can municipalities. Negation of change can be
catastrophic, as has been proven time and again.
IV.

Learning from Good and Bad Solutions

Not all solutions to the municipalities’ problems are
successful or fit into a preventive paradigm. However, one list of

44

Id.
Id.
46
Id. (“The state governor declared a financial emergency in March 2013,
appointing an emergency manager. ‘Bankruptcy is the only feasible option
to fix the city’s finances and do what is right for the 700,000 people of
Detroit,’ Snyder said.”).
45
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solutions stood out in my research and offers suggestions for
preventive measures.47
Cooperation makes a big difference. The Rhode Island city
of “Central Falls, population 19,000 and merely one square mile” in
area, filed for a Chapter 9 bankruptcy and emerged after thirteen
months.48 The city established a six-year financial plan.49 The parties
negotiated rather than litigated.50 The city was also empowered to
overhaul its pension obligations.51 Significantly, the negotiators
looked to the future, not only the past. Similarly, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania reduced its debt and established a debt policy—a “payas-you-go capital investment budget” and “a shared financial
management system”—with another county.52 The unions worked
with the negotiators as well recognizing that “everyone underst[ood]
that the long-term goal [wa]s for the city to be on good financial
footing.”53 Despite having “been in a dark place,” Pittsburgh was
“looking to be in a better place.”54 Thus, bankruptcy may be a better
solution for some, like Central Falls, but not others. That is because
bankruptcy may create “winners and losers” rather than a
compromise solution.55
There is also the “people’s factor.”56 Particularly when
compared to the “in-fighting” that occurred in Harrisburg’s
bankruptcy proceedings, the examples set by Stockton, Detroit, and
Central Falls illustrate a better way to restructure debt. Exemplifying
Pennsylvania’s “in-fighting,” a city council president of a small town
declared on television that he would not vote for the mayor’s
proposal “because [he] hate[d] him.”57 In-fighting, however, does not
47

See Paul Burton, Municipalities in Fiscal Distress Find There’s No Easy
Way Out, BOND BUYER, Mar. 18, 2013, at 1.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 2.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See id. at 3.
56
Id. (“Harrisburg has been synonymous with political in-fighting that
borders on slapstick, notably between Mayor Linda Thompson and the City
Council. Thompson, on city website postings, called her opponents ‘unfit to
hold office,’ while Bill Cluck, president of the Harrisburg Authority public
works agency, called her ‘mentally ill’ in a recent local video spot.”).
57
Id.
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produce winners. The better approach is to compromise and seek the
best outcome for the most people. As one expert artfully stated,
“People ask what side I’m on. I’m on the side of a solution.”58
Comparatively, “[t]he Rhode Island approach to distressed
communities is very different from” the approach taken “in
Pennsylvania, where the governor [Tom Corbett] ha[d] essentially
taken a sink-or-swim attitude toward the municipalities.”59
The reasons for distress vary. One reason could be leverage:
distress may come with a “crisis of liquidity,” especially when the
economy “is going the wrong way and revenues are not coming in as
well as anticipated.”60 Another reason could be mismanagement.61
And an “adversarial relationship of state versus local” government
can be devastating as well.62 Harrisburg, for example, built an
incinerator and incurred a debt of over $300 million.63 The
municipality engaged in other deals, which some considered
imprudent. Ultimately, “[t]he common thread is that the governments
affected did not analyze and keep track of these formidable costs.
Neither the municipal side nor the union side did anything like
sensitivity analyses fifteen years ago . . . . Municipalities have to
keep track of what they owe and how much they can pay.”64
Is bankruptcy the only way? As noted above, bankruptcy is
expensive, but control boards might be expensive as well.65 The law
is not uniform and neither is the difference between control boards
and bankruptcy process.
A.

General Preventive Policy-Rules to Avoid Future
Failures of Municipalities

Americans are often suspicious of government and prefer
instead to focus on protecting the efficiency of the private sector.
Based on this American culture with respect to government power,
Americans, at some level, intentionally create and maintain an
58

Id.
Id.; see also Williams v. Corbett, 916 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597–600 (M.D.
Pa. 2012) (dismissing plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania’s Financially Distressed Municipalities Act).
60
Burton, supra note 47, at 2.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 4.
65
Burton, supra note 3.
59
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inefficient government. For example, merely observe the police and
security arrangements in the U.S., and you will undoubtedly find
duplication and bifurcation that renders security forces competitors.
Therefore, we must accept the conclusion that the balance of power
between federal, state, and municipal governments is unlikely to
change in the near future. We might assume that solutions will be
implemented piecemeal when, or perhaps only after, a severe
problem arises. This will result in a patchwork process with
patchwork solutions. Currently, the bankruptcy and restructuring
process arises only after severe problems have mushroomed. At this
point we find municipalities’ and participants’ problems facing rigid,
old, and inappropriate rules lacking in flexibility.66 As one expert
observed, “[s]tate governments have had a major role in how
municipalities deal with severe fiscal distress.”67 This approach may
be rational, but it is unlikely to earn universal acceptance in the near
future.
A second aspect of American culture that is unlikely to
change is the tendency to resort to litigation. There is a drive to win
rather than compromise. There is a tendency to sue. To court we go!
Therefore, when change is required that may reduce the benefits of
some players involved in municipal distress, there might be strong
resistance in the form of an attempt to assert the parties’ rights in
court. Even at the cost of the entity’s existence, some groups may
prefer to rush to court to prevent losing their state-provided benefits.
“Winning all” for one interest group, however, may cause “losing
all” for both other groups and the municipality as a whole. This
approach is too destructive in the long-term. Therefore, a mechanism
must be installed to force all parties to the negotiation table, to
arbitration, or to mediation, before rushing to court.
One such mechanism is forced negotiations and mediation.
The U.S. has a history of the use of such a mechanism and a related
mechanism—arbitration. However, arbitration is far more coercive
and final. Moreover, arbitration can produce unfair results to some
parties, especially if the rationales for the results are not publicly
disclosed. It has been argued that disclosure of the results and the
66

Robert Slavin, Larkin: State Actions Are Key to Local Bankruptcies,
BOND BUYER (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://bondbuyer.com/
issues/121_150/larkin-says-state-actions-are-key-to-local-bankruptcy1042644-1.html (“In 22 states municipalities cannot declare themselves
bankrupt . . . .”).
67
Id.
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reasons behind an arbitrator’s decision is costly, and neither the
arbitrators nor the lawyers, and sometimes the parties, wish to bear
the costs.68 However, when small changes are negotiated, the parties
may, but need not, disclose their reasons. In the case of arbitration,
when one or more parties are losers, the incentives for disclosure and
reasons for the decision differ with respect to the winners and the
losers. This issue may be left to each municipality either in each case
or in principle. In any event, the topic requires a far more detailed
discussion, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
Forced arbitration and mediations with municipal employees
has raised criticisms. There are complaints about costly mediators
that are imposed on municipalities in financial straits.69 About twenty
states impose such binding arbitration on their local governments.70
Arguably, this system was established when public employees had
little power.71 Today, however, where unions are powerful and
organized, the system may often be biased against taxpayers and
result in large awards.72 That is why unions press to expand this
system, especially if the cities cannot afford to pay the awards. This
pits the taxpayers and creditors against the public employees.73 The
solution, therefore, may lie in the identity of the arbitrators, the rules
that they must follow, and the openness of the process.
B.

Recommendations

In sum, I propose the following changes to be applied in
every municipality.
First, every municipality should employ a financial manager,
either internal or external.74 The manager must be imposed with
68
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Steven Malanga, Death by Arbitration, CITY J., Autumn 2012, available
at
http://city-journal.org/2012/22_4_snd-arbitration.html
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strict fiduciary duties and have the power to point to signals of
distress and suggest some prophylactic measures. This manager may
have a position of a business judge and perhaps tenure of some years.
The manager should evaluate both short- and long-term risk
assessment plans, thereby avoiding hitting while the iron is hot and
dispensing with the belief that tomorrow will take care of itself.
Second, the manager’s identified problems should be
addressed by appropriate experts and lead—within a fixed period of
time—to changes to resolve the problems. Accordingly,
“[m]unicipalities must keep track of their finances: what they owe
and how much they can pay.”75
Third, if proposed changes are not acceptable to the relevant
parties, negotiations or arbitration should take place within a fixed
period of time.
Fourth, the changes should be subject to existing legal rights
and duties, provided the affected parties agree to abrogation of their
legal rights (but not of their legal duties).
Fifth, unless there is a good reason to close the doors to the
public, the proceedings should be publicly conducted.
V.

Conclusion: An Opportunity to Clean House

The crisis in the municipalities offers an opportunity to clean
house—identify the wrongful activities that may have abused the
public trust and establish stricter compliance rules within the
municipal and taxpayer domains. Some of these wrongs are being
uncovered and pursued in the courts.76 Specifically, “Providence,
R.I.’s lawsuit accusing an actuary of miscalculating city savings on
pension benefits reflects the increasing exposure of city advisors and
vendor firms to liability, municipal and legal experts say.”77
Most of the proposed changes outlined in this paper should
be accepted voluntarily by the involved parties. However, there
new-contract-1048924-1.html (“The San Bernardino City Council on
Tuesday approved the contract for its new city manager, Allen Parker,
agreeing to pay him $221,976 per year, according to the San Bernardino
Sun.”).
75
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should be an exception in the following cases, where the changes
should become mandatory. The following are very broad-line
suggestions, which might lead to many exceptions once they are
viewed in detail.
First, if a municipality does not accept and practice these
conditions, and if it fails to pay its debts, then it can be declared
bankrupt and be subject to bankruptcy law.78 Second, a bankrupt
municipality may be required by the bankruptcy court to increase its
taxes on its current citizens, as well as on those businesses that left
the municipality within one year before bankruptcy. The purpose of
the exception is to involve the parties to ensure that the failure of the
municipality will affect all of them and not only others.
This proposal is intentionally left broad. If considered, it
must be subject to many conditions, and perhaps tailored to fit
different municipalities. The main purpose of this proposal is to
impose on all beneficiaries of the municipalities’ services a similar
incentive to avoid the municipality’s bankruptcy and to work
together to make them successful both financially and humanely—
hallmarks of any good government.
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In re City of Stockton, Cal., 478 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (“The
retired employees of the City of Stockton want this court to order the City
to keep paying for their health benefits during this chapter 9 case.”).

